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Proving Toxic Harm: Getting Past Slice And Dice Tactics
Andrew S. Lipton
INTRODUCTION PART I: BAD LAW MAKES FOR BAD RESULTS
In complex litigation, such as personal injury or wrongful death actions
based upon exposure to toxic and hazardous materials or pharmaceutical injuries,
the critical issue is often one of causation: whether the substance in question
1
caused the injury. All too often, courts buy into defendants’ arguments that the
evidence must be sliced and diced into smaller and smaller subsets until it is
2
virtually impossible to prove that the exposure caused the injury. Plaintiffs’
experts are ridiculed and attacked for reaching conclusions different from the
3
corporate defendants. Anything not paid for by and supportive of industry is
4
deemed “junk science.”
Texas offers us an extreme example of the obstacles put in the path of a
5
plaintiff seeking to prove causation against a major corporation. Vioxx was a
6
non-steroidal anti-inflammatory pain medication. Merck & Co. had put it on the
market in May of 1999, but just a few years later, on September 30, 2004, Merck
withdrew Vioxx from the market because clinical trials had shown the drug
7
increased the risk of heart attack and other cardiovascular problems. Thousands
8
of lawsuits were filed. After a number of bell-weather trials in the multidistrict
litigation (MDL) and a number of state court verdicts, Merck agreed to a $4.85
9
billion settlement of the federal multidistrict litigation.
While the federal court in the MDL had permitted plaintiffs’ experts to
testify that short-term low dose use of the drug could cause heart attacks, based,
among other things, upon their interpretation of the raw data from Merck’s
clinical trials, the Texas Supreme Court took a radically different view in Merck
10
& Co. v. Garza. Even though Merck had conceded that clinical trials were the
* Andrew S. Lipton is admitted to practice in Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio and is Of Counsel to
the Texas law firm of Hobson & Bradley. He has concentrated on toxic tort cases for over thirty-five years,
handling injury and death claims involving exposures to asbestos, benzene, beryllium, vinyl chloride, radiation,
pesticides, and other organic solvents and toxic wastes. Mr. Lipton may be reached at alipton@liptonlaw.net.
1. See infra Part I.
2. See generally PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).
3. Id.
4. Peter W. Huber described junk science as “meaningless data, fearful speculation and fantastic
conjecture . . . elaborate, systematized, jargon-filled, serious-sounding deceptions.” HUBER, supra note 2.
5. See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Garza, 277 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. App. 4th 2008).
6. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Garza, 347 S.W.3d 256, 260 (Tex. 2011).
7. Merck & Co., Inc, 277 S.W.3d at 435.
8. Merck & Co., Inc, 347 S.W.3d at 261–62.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 265.
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best evidence for determining the relationship between a drug and a health
outcome, the plaintiffs’ experts were not permitted to base their opinions on this
11
data. Instead, Texas demanded at least two statistically significant epidemiology
12
studies that show a doubling of the risk at a similar dose for a similar duration.
This can almost never be done because each subgroup would be too small to
13
generate statistically significant results. If a plaintiff can somehow find two
such studies, the court will then conduct a “secondary reliability inquiry”
14
questioning the soundness of each study’s findings and underlying integrity.
15
With this impossible burden, the door slammed shut on the plaintiffs.
As will be discussed more fully below, Texas does not stand alone in its
impedance of science in the courtroom. Other courts similarly demand levels of
certainty and methodologies simply not found in the real world of science and
16
epidemiology. The result is a protection of corporate wealth and a shifting of the
burden of injury and disease away from the responsible party and onto the victim.
This Article examines much of the case law regarding expert epidemiological
testimony, the hurdles plaintiffs must overcome, and how arguments can be
framed to enhance the likelihood that an expert’s opinion will be admitted at trial.
17
Part I of this Article addresses the Supreme Court triumvirate that set the
standard for the admissibility of expert scientific and technical opinions. The
judge has been anointed gatekeeper to assess the reliability and thus admissibility
of each expert’s opinions. Part II looks at those cases that have interpreted the
admissibility standards so narrowly that a plaintiff’s epidemiology expert is
rarely permitted to testify. The court achieves this by dissecting each piece of
data that the expert relies upon to see if it withstands scrutiny and independently
supports the opinion being offered, even when that was never the expert’s
intention. Part III of this Article examines those judicial decisions that seek to
understand and permit scientific testimony following methodologies actually
used by scientists in the real world. These courts recognize the holistic approach
so often used by real scientists outside the courtroom. Part IV highlights a
framework for presenting a plaintiff’s epidemiology expert so as to improve the
likelihood that the opinions will withstand scrutiny and be deemed admissible at
trial.
11. Merck, 277 S.W.3d at 435.
12. Id. at 263–264.
13. See Bernadette Dijkman, et. al., How to Work with a Subgroup Analysis, NAT’L CTR. FOR
BIOTECHNOLOGY INFORMATION (2009), available at http://www.topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/
lawsuit-news/4621-merck-agrees-to-23m-vioxx-class-action-lawsuit-settlement/ (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (“The chance of falsely obtaining significant subgroup effects and interactions (i.e., type 1 errors)
increases quite dramatically when many subgroup analyses are performed.”).
14. Id. at 266.
15. See generally id. at 433.
16. Id.
17. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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INTRODUCTION PART II: EXPERT EPIDEMIOLOGY TESTIMONY IS GENERALLY
NECESSARY TO PROVE CAUSATION IN A TOXIC TORT CASE
Most courts look at causation as a two-part question. First is the issue of
18
“general causation”—whether the substance can cause the injury. The second
19
issue is of “specific causation”–whether the substance caused this injury.
Resolution of these issues depends almost entirely upon expert opinion
20
testimony. The admissibility of the expert opinion, governed by Federal
21
Evidence Rule 702, is thus critical to the case.
Two decades ago, the US Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow
22
Pharmaceuticals, requiring trial court judges to act as gatekeepers to assess the
reliability and relevance of expert scientific opinions. This meant that the
expert’s methodology had to be scientifically valid and the opinions had to “fit”
23
the evidence in the case.
It has been my observation that, since Daubert, numerous courts have
aggressively exercised their gatekeeper roles to reject expert causation testimony,
particularly in toxic tort cases, due to a refusal to recognize methodologies that
are widely accepted in the scientific community, misconceptions about the
science, or by taking an atomistic approach that examines individually and
24
independently each piece of scientific evidence that the expert relies upon.
Thomas O. McGarity calls this the “Corpuscular Approach to Expert
25
Testimony.” Courts taking this “corpuscular” view have all too often rejected
animal studies, in vitro and in vivo studies, case studies, meta-analyses, and
26
weight-of-the-evidence analysis. When looking at epidemiologic studies, they
have misunderstood or misapplied relative risk, statistical significance, or doseresponse to reject expert testimony based upon generally accepted
methodologies. Quite simply, the “corpuscular” approach slices and dices an
expert’s opinion, and the material relied upon, into ever-smaller subparts to see if
they can each withstand scrutiny.

18. Soldo v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 244 F. Supp.2d 434, 525 (W.D. Penn. 2003).
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based
upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. FED. R. EVID. 702.
22. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
23. Id. at 591.
24. See Thomas O. McGarity, Proposal for Linking Culpability and Causation to Ensure Corporate
Accountability for Toxic Risks, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 18 (2001).
25. See id.
26. Id.

709

03_LIPTON_V2_3-18-14_FINAL_03.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/10/2014 10:52 AM

2014 / Proving Toxic Harm: Getting Past Slice And Dice Tactics
Usually this “corpuscular” view of a plaintiff’s causation expert has been due
to the defendants’ urging, asking the court to parse the individual studies and data
an expert relies upon, while at the same time ignoring the well-recognized
weight-of-the-evidence methodology that permits scientific opinions based upon
conclusions drawn from the totality of the evidence, with no individual study or
27
piece of data having to be sufficient on its own to prove causation. The slicing
and dicing “veg-o-matic” has made it into the courtroom at the expense of truth
and a nuanced understanding of science.
Fortunately, a few courts throughout the years have recognized that this
“corpuscular” view, slicing and dicing an expert’s opinion, is not a proper
28
application of Rule 702 or Daubert. For example, United States v. W.R. Grace
noted that Evidence Rule 702 requires a “holistic approach” to an expert’s
opinion evidence.
Generally, an inquiry under Rule 702 examines the expert’s testimony as
a whole. The 702 inquiry typically does not examine the reliability or
29
relevance of particular data sets that underlie the expert testimony . . . .
Other courts have recognized that their responsibility is not to become superscientists, but rather simply to confirm that the expert “employs in the courtroom
the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in
30
the relevant field.” The inquiry into the expert’s methodology and the reliability
of the epidemiologic opinions to be offered is not an excuse to determine what
the judge personally believes, but rather is supposed to focus on what expert
epidemiologists would find reliable. “In determining whether the facts or data are
admissible, the proper inquiry is not what the court deems reliable, but what
31
experts in the relevant discipline deem it to be.”
32
Recently, in Milward v. Acuity Specialty Product Group, Inc., the First
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the liberal intent of Federal Evidence Rule
702 and permitted expert testimony based upon a weight-of-the-evidence
33
analysis. This approach “focuses upon the totality of scientific information and
34
asks in a holistic way whether a cause-effect conclusion seems warranted.” This
weight-of-the-evidence methodology is used by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), National Toxicology Program (NTP), Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), Occupational Safety and Health

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
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McGarity, supra note 25, at 19.
504 F.3d 745 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 762.
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 593 A.2d 733, 746 (N.J. 1991).
639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011).
See generally id.
McGarity, supra note 25, at 23.
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Administration (OSHA), International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC)
35
and World Health Organization (WHO), among other entities. It is a standard
and reliable process for determining causation. If judges refuse to accept this
methodology and instead use the “corpuscular approach to expert testimony,” the
science done in the laboratory and relied upon by federal, state, and international
regulatory and standard-setting bodies will be excluded by the courts. This is
36
precisely the kind of dichotomy Daubert was intended to prevent. If the
methodology is sufficiently reliable to be used in the laboratory or by a
regulatory body, then it is sufficiently reliable for the courtroom. It is then up to
the jury to decide if the expert’s conclusions are sufficiently persuasive.
PART I: THE ADVENT OF THE DAUBERT ERA HAS MADE THE ADMISSION OF
EXPERT EPIDEMIOLOGY OPINIONS FAR MORE DIFFICULT
For decades in the past, the admissibility of expert testimony was governed
37
by the Frye standard. Under that test, the question was whether the expert’s
opinion had received general acceptance by at least a substantial minority of the
38
scientific community. Unless a theory was generally accepted, it would not be
39
permitted into evidence. This standard still remains in effect in some state
40
courts, such as Illinois.
Then, there was a sea-change in the early 1990’s due to a US Supreme Court
41
case, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, where the high court looked at
whether the general acceptance test should be applied to assess the admissibility
42
of scientific testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence. In Daubert, the
plaintiffs claimed the pregnancy drug Bendectin had caused their children’s birth
43
defects. The plaintiffs’ experts sought to offer opinions on causation based
upon:


Laboratory studies showing Bendectin was a teratogen (causes
damage to a fetus);



Animal studies showing Bendectin can cause birth defects;

35. See Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, Regulatory Science in Rulemaking and Tort: Unifying
the Weight of the Evidence Approach, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 65, 67, 91 (2013).
36. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
37. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See People v. McKown, 875 N.E.2d 1029, 1031, 1036 (Ill. 2007) (stating that the Frye test applies in
Illinois).
41. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
42. See generally id.
43. Id. at 582.
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Pharmacological studies showing the chemical structure of
Bendectin was similar to substances known to cause birth defects;
and



Meta-analyses of prior epidemiological studies.

44

The trial court threw out the expert testimony and granted summary
45
judgment to the defendant. The court had found that the experts’ re-analyses of
epidemiology studies were not published or peer-reviewed, and that laboratory
research, animal studies, and pharmacological comparisons were not sufficient to
46
prove Bendectin caused birth defects. The trial court concluded that the experts’
opinions were not generally accepted in the scientific community and therefore
47
48
not admissible. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court accepted the case to examine whether the Frye general
acceptance standard was the appropriate test for the admissibility of expert
49
opinions under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Because the Federal Rules were
intended to liberalize the admissibility of evidence, the Court concluded that the
50
old Frye Standard was no longer appropriate. In fact, the Court emphasized “the
liberal thrust of the Federal Rules and their general approach of relaxing the
51
traditional barriers to opinion testimony.”
The Court found that under FRE 702 the judge is to act as a gatekeeper to
52
make certain scientific testimony is both reliable and relevant. The Court
reasoned that reliability is tied to the scientific validity of the methodology
53
applied by the expert to reach the opinions to be offered. Relevance is tied to
54
whether the opinions “fit” the facts of the case.
The Supreme Court suggested a number of factors, none of which were
definitive or exclusive, that courts should consider when testing the reliability of
an expert’s methodology:


whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested;



whether the theory has been subject to peer review and publication;



the known or potential rate of error; and

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
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Id. at 583.
Id.
Id. at 583–84.
Id. at 584.
Id.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 588 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 592–93.
Id. at 590.
Id. at 591.
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the degree the theory has been generally accepted in the relevant
55
scientific community.

Significantly, the Court noted that the inquiry is flexible and the focus “must
be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they
56
57
generate.” Moreover, citing Rule 703, the court recognized expert opinions are
to be admitted where the facts or data are “of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
58
subject.”
This liberalized approach to the admission of expert testimony unfortunately
did not last long. Following Daubert, the Supreme Court revisited the question of
59
the admissibility of expert opinions in General Electric Company v. Joiner.
There, the Court concluded that a trial court’s decision in its role as gatekeeper
was to be reviewed on appeal by the abuse of discretion standard; that is, the trial
60
court’s decision could be reversed only where it was “manifestly erroneous.”
Significantly, while the focus in Daubert had been solely on the expert’s
methodology, in Joiner the Court noted that often “conclusions and methodology
61
are not entirely distinct from one another.” Thus, the Court held that while
experts may extrapolate from existing data and research to reach an opinion, a
court need not accept an expert’s opinion that is connected to the underlying data
solely by the “ipse dixit” of the expert where “there is simply too great an
62
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” The door to an
examination of an expert’s conclusions, not just methodology, was now open.
The decision in Joiner is significant because the Court found that it was not
an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have examined the sufficiency of the
epidemiologic studies the plaintiff’s experts had relied upon to conclude that
63
PCBs could and in fact did cause the plaintiff’s lung cancer. Likewise, the Court
found no abuse of discretion where the trial court had found that the experts’
extrapolation from various studies and animal research to reach their conclusion
64
on causation was impermissible.
Justice Breyer, concurring, expressed concern that the gatekeeper function
under Rule 702 asks judges to make “subtle and sophisticated determinations”
even though these judges are “not scientists and do not have the scientific

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 593–94.
Id. at 595.
FED. R. EVID. 703.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
522 U.S. 136 (1997).
Id. at 141– 42.
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id. at 146–47.
Id. at 144–45.
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65

training that can facilitate the making of such decisions.” Justice Breyer then
66
suggested that in such cases judges use FRE 706 to “appoint an expert to serve
on behalf of the court” to independently advise the judge about scientific
67
methodology.
In his dissent in Joiner, Justice Stevens noted that the plaintiff’s experts had
used a weight-of-the-evidence methodology, relying on all of the studies taken
68
together, along with other available data, to reach their conclusions. “The
District Court, however, examined the studies one by one and concluded that
none was sufficient to show a link between PCB’s and lung cancer . . . . The
focus of the opinion was on the separate studies and the conclusions of the
69
experts, not on the experts’ methodology.” Like the Court of Appeals, Justice
Stevens found that the weight-of-the-evidence methodology was scientifically
acceptable and valid. “It is not intrinsically ‘unscientific’ for experienced
professionals to arrive at a conclusion by weighing all available scientific
evidence—this is not the sort of ‘junk science’ with which Daubert was
70
concerned.”
Finally, Justice Stevens found solace in the fact that the majority had not held
that it would have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have admitted
71
the expert testimony. “[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of
65. Id. at 147–48.
66. FED. R. EVID. 706. Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses
(a) Appointment Process. On a party’s motion or on its own, the court may order the parties to
show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed and may ask the parties to submit
nominations. The court may appoint any expert that the parties agree on and any of its own
choosing. But the court may only appoint someone who consents to act.
(b) Expert’s Role. The court must inform the expert of the expert’s duties. The court may do so in
writing and have a copy filed with the clerk or may do so orally at a conference in which the
parties have an opportunity to participate. The expert:
(1) must advise the parties of any findings the expert makes;
(2) may be deposed by any party;
(3) may be called to testify by the court or any party; and
(4) may be cross-examined by any party, including the party that called the expert.
(c) Compensation. The expert is entitled to a reasonable compensation, as set by the court. The
compensation is payable as follows:
(1) in a criminal case or in a civil case involving just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment, from any funds that are provided by law; and
(2) in any other civil case, by the parties in the proportion and at the time that the court
directs—and the compensation is then charged like other costs.
(d) Disclosing the Appointment to the Jury. The court may authorize disclosure to the jury that the
court appointed the expert.
(e) Parties’ Choice of Their Own Experts. This rule does not limit a party in calling its own
experts.
67. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 at 150.
68. Id. at 151.
69. Id. at 152–53 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 153.
71. Id. at 155.
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Evidence requires a district judge to reject an expert’s conclusions and keep them
from the jury when they fit the facts of the case and are based on reliable
72
scientific methodology.”
This case highlights the problem with an abuse of discretion standard for
73
review of decisions on the admissibility of expert testimony. The trial court
74
rejected the expert testimony in Joiner under the abuse of discretion standard.
But as Justice Stevens recognized, the Supreme Court did not say that if the
lower court had reached the opposite conclusion it would have been an abuse of
75
discretion. Once the expert testimony was held inadmissible, the plaintiff could
not meet her burden of proof and summary judgment for defendant was
76
inevitable. Yet under normal circumstances, the summary judgment would have
been reviewed de novo and examined for any factual or legal error. Instead, the
77
critical evidence was rejected under a standard looking only for gross error.
78
Finally, in Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court
held that the Daubert gatekeeper function applies to all expert opinions,
including technical and other specialized knowledge, not just scientific
79
opinions. Furthermore, the trial court has broad discretion not only in its
determination on the admissibility of the expert opinions, but also as to the
80
procedures to follow in fulfilling its “gatekeeper role.” While the objective of
the gatekeeper requirement “is to make certain that an expert . . . employs in the
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an
81
expert in the relevant field,” that simple standard is frequently ignored, as
82
evidenced by Merck & Co., Inc. v. Garza, where the Texas Supreme Court drew
a bright line (requiring two statistically significant studies showing at least a
83
doubling of the risk), even though that is not how experts in the field practice.
While the Supreme Court’s original intention in Daubert was to liberalize the
admission of scientific opinion testimony and permit novel but scientifically
sound theories to be put before a jury, that all too often has not been the practical
result. For example, on remand in Daubert, the Court of Appeals applied the new
84
standard and still threw out the plaintiffs’ expert testimony.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
See id. at 155.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id. at 143–46.
Id.
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id. at 152.
347 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2011).
Id. at 265.
See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
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Under Daubert and its progeny, if the court determines that an expert is
qualified, the judge then looks at the methodology, studies, and data relied upon
by the expert to decide if these support the expert’s opinions. Under the old Frye
standard, interpretation of studies and data was the function of the expert; and the
court was not supposed to determine whether the expert properly relied upon data
85
and studies that experts in the field generally rely upon. Thus, under Frye, it
was generally deemed wrong for a judge to independently review each study or
piece of data the expert relied upon and decide if it supports the expert’s
86
opinion. The question was whether the opinions were generally accepted by at
87
least a substantial minority of experts in the field. Peer review and publication
was thus pivotal to show general acceptance in the relevant scientific
88
community.
Now, after Daubert and Joiner in particular, the judge often substitutes his
own assessment of scientific studies for that of the expert. This is the judge as
super-scientist. Justice Rehnquist, in his concurrence in Daubert, recognized that
Rule 702 gave the judge a gatekeeping responsibility, but he did not believe that
the Rule “imposes on them either the obligation or authority to become amateur
89
scientists in order to perform that role.” Unfortunately, in spite of the Chief
Justice’s warning, too many judges look at each piece of the scientific puzzle
separately to see if it is reliable, instead of looking at the totality of the evidence
to see if, as a whole, it supports the expert’s opinion. Judges engage in this
“corpuscular” or “slice and dice” process, reinterpreting the scientific studies and
articles the experts rely upon, even though they lack the expertise and what they
do is not consistent with good science or good law.
The issue for plaintiffs therefore becomes how to persuade a trial judge to
look at an expert’s methodology the way scientists look at problems and reach
conclusions outside the courtroom, rather than defense lawyers’ approach, which
wants the underlying basis for opinions to be parsed ad nauseum. By examining
how some judges have misunderstood or misapplied scientific methodology at
defendants’ urging, and how other judges have implicitly understood and
accepted the scientific method, a framework for future arguments in Daubert
hearings can be constructed.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
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Donaldson v. Cen. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 324 (Ill. 2002).
Id. at 326.
Id. at 323–24.
See generally Donaldson, 767 N.E.2d at 314.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600–01.
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PART II: MISPLACED ATTACKS ON EPIDEMIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE IMPROPERLY
KEEP PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERTS AT BAY
As noted above, one of the greatest problems found in decisions from courts
considering expert epidemiological testimony is the failure or refusal of judges to
look at the science in the same manner as scientists: the court “slices and dices”
the studies and other data relied upon by the expert to determine if each piece of
the total puzzle independently supports the expert’s opinion. Of course, this is
precisely what the defendants want and urge the court to do. By taking this
approach, courts ignore general scientific principles, misinterpret and misapply
generally accepted methodology, and reach distorted and incorrect results. These
courts refuse to apply in the courtroom the same methodology that scientists use
in the field, and American and international regulatory and standard-setting
bodies apply. While the court in Joiner may have said this is not an abuse of
90
discretion, it certainly is bad science and bad policy.
91
In Henrickson v. ConocoPhillips, the plaintiff claimed his acute
myelogenous leukemia (AML) was caused by benzene found in the gasoline he
92
was exposed to when he worked in a terminal and as a gasoline tanker driver.
93
There was no dispute that benzene causes AML. However, the court focused on
94
defendant’s argument that benzene in gasoline cannot cause AML. The court
said it could not presume that the qualitative toxic and carcinogenic effects of
benzene from all sources are the same and questioned whether benzene in
95
gasoline was somehow different from benzene alone. The court also questioned
whether the small amount of benzene in gasoline (one to two percent) was
96
enough to cause AML.
In conducting its gatekeeper role, the court stated that to extrapolate from
benzene studies to gasoline containing benzene, the experts “must explain and
97
demonstrate why the extrapolation is scientifically proper.” Plaintiff’s expert
epidemiologist had done just that, stating in his report that the “toxicity of
gasoline to the bone marrow has mirrored the toxicity of benzene even though
98
the literature related to gasoline has lagged that of benzene.” He pointed to
studies of “occupational exposure to gasoline containing 1-2% benzene [that]
demonstrate an elevated risk of leukemia, including AML, with cumulative

90. See generally General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
91. 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (E.D. Wash. 2009).
92. Id. at 1148.
93. See id. at 1156 (indicating that the only “question before the court is whether exposure to the
benzene–component of gasoline is capable of causing AML”).
94. Id at 1156.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1156.
98. Id. at 1151.
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benzene exposures of as low as 1.5 ppm-years.” He also showed
epidemiological studies “demonstrat[ing] ‘significantly elevated risks’ of AML
among those who transport gasoline and those who are engaged in terminal
100
work . . . where gasoline is loaded and unloaded.” And finally, he noted that the
“genotoxic effects of benzene in gasoline support the biological plausibility of
101
gasoline to induce leukemia.”
The court concluded that the expert’s general causation testimony “must be
excluded because the studies [he relied] upon singly or in combination [did] not
102
support the causation conclusions [he made].” The court was persuaded by the
defendant’s arguments even though they were based upon contradictory and
inconsistent epidemiological evidence, such as refinery studies which did not
even show AML was caused by benzene (a generally recognized fact) and
compared occupational exposures to exposures in the general population
103
(ignoring the healthy worker effect). Clearly, the judge improperly weighed
contradictory evidence and chose to adopt the defendant’s arguments.
On the issue of epidemiological studies, the court noted that plaintiff’s expert
had relied upon studies that just showed positive associations (relative risk (RR)
104
< 2) but not a supposedly definitive causal relationship (RR > 2). In general,
105
epidemiological studies are most often used to prove general causation. “[A]
relative risk greater than 1.0” means the substance “has the capacity to cause the
106
disease.” A relative risk above 2.0 implies a probability that the agent at issue
107
caused the illness being studied. It also indicates “that the agent more likely
108
than not was responsible for a particular individual’s disease.” This means that
a relative risk that is greater than 2.0 is probative evidence of both general and
109
specific causation.
But the Henrickson court, like so many others, refused to permit reliance on
studies showing a RR < 2 as just one piece of a puzzle showing general
causation, even though epidemiologists routinely rely upon such studies in their
scientific practice. Confusion over relative risk has become a major problem in
Daubert reviews because of this growing refusal to consider RRs < 2 as being
99. Id. at 1168.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1175.
103. See, e.g., Bernard D. Goldstein & Stuart L. Shalat, The Causal Relation Between Benzene and
Multiple Myeloma, 95 BLOOD 1512, 1512 (Feb. 15, 2000); Peter F. Infante, Benzene Exposure and Multiple
Myeloma: A Detailed Meta-Analysis of Benzene Cohort Studies, 1076 ANN. OF N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI. 90, 90–91
(2006).
104. Henrickson, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 1175.
105. Id. at 1158.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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reliable in conjunction with other evidence to prove general causation. The key
to the bad result in Henrickson was the court’s refusal to look at the totality of the
evidence or to examine the methodology applied by experts: conclusions based
111
upon all the pieces of the puzzle in conjunction, not piecemeal.
Another example of slicing and dicing can be found in Valentine v.
112
Conrad. There, the plaintiff had worked in a laboratory at a PPG Industries
paint plant and was exposed to various toxic chemicals, including organic
113
solvents such as benzene. He developed glioblastoma multiforme and died. The
widow sought workers compensation where she only had to show that something
114
in the work environment had “contributed” to her husband’s brain tumor.
The Ohio Supreme Court, applying the Daubert standard, held that in
analyzing the methodology and reliability of an expert’s opinion, the trial court
115
must “apprise itself of the details of the proffered evidence.” Thus, in Ohio,
courts are required to examine each of the studies that an expert relies upon and
116
decide if it supports what the expert claims. This clearly turns the judge into a
super-scientist who examines studies and data relied upon by experts, reinterprets them, and decides if they support the expert’s opinions.
The court in Valentine concluded that none of the studies that the plaintiff’s
expert witnesses relied upon involved workers in the same industry, none showed
a direct causal relation between a single specific chemical and brain tumors, and
117
animal studies were not adequate to prove causation. So, the court sliced and
diced the studies and data relied upon by the experts, found that each individually
did not support the experts’ opinions, and excluded the testimony, leading to
118
summary judgment for the defendant.
But the majority decision failed to address significant evidence that played a
119
critical part in the experts’ methodology. Mr. Valentine and a coworker died
120
121
within a week of each other. Both had glioblastoma multiforme. Both had
122
worked for thirty years in the same lab and were exposed to the same chemicals.

110. This is evident in the recent Texas Supreme Court decision rejecting reliance on any study with a
relative risk <2. See generally Merck & Co. Inc. v. Garza, 277 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2008). A bright-line legal test
has replaced science.
111. See generally Henrickson, 605 F. Supp 2d.
112. 850 N.E.2d 683 (Ohio 2006).
113. Id. at 685.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 687.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 688.
119. Id. at 689.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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There were only seventeen people with these exposures for this length of time.
124
The odds of the two of them dying like this were 1 in 1,442,206.
Moreover, various studies cited by the experts showed that workers exposed to
125
the same types of toxic chemicals found in the PPG lab developed brain tumors.
These studies included a petrochemical research facility and a petrochemical
126
plant. They also included a study of workers in China showing persons exposed
127
to organic solvents had a significantly elevated risk for brain cancer. The experts
also cited studies showing that lab technicians and chemists who, like Mr.
Valentine, routinely handled solvents had a higher than expected incidence of brain
128
cancer. Plaintiff’s neurosurgeon also cited genetic research showing that animals
129
exposed to benzene developed the same type of brain tumor as Mr. Valentine. He
concluded that the cumulative evidence in the medical literature and his twentyfive years of experience provided a substantial basis for the opinion that long-term
excessive exposure to the solvents and other cancer-causing chemicals identified in
Mr. Valentine’s work environment can cause brain cancers such as glioblastoma
130
multiforme.
As the dissent concluded, “These witnesses were not ‘hired guns.’ They did
not use unscientific principles and methodology. These opinions are not ‘junk
131
science.’” But the court threw out the testimony by looking at each piece of
evidence that the experts relied upon separately and finding that it alone was not
132
sufficient to support the opinion on causation. The court refused to accept that
133
scientists look at the totality of the evidence, not just individual bits in isolation.
A litany of other cases has rejected epidemiologic testimony for various
134
reasons. For example, the court in Castellow v. Chevron USA, Inc. refused to
accept opinion testimony based on case reports on the grounds they were
135
“unscientific and speculative.” Similarly, the court in LeBlanc v. Chevron USA,
136
Inc. held that “individual case reports, while interesting, do not constitute reliable
137
scientific evidence” to support an opinion on general causation. That same court

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
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Id.
Id. at 689.
Id. at 691.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 691.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 693.
Id. at 687–88
Id.
97 F. Supp. 2d 780 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
Id. at 787.
513 F. Supp. 2d 641 (E.D. La. 2007).
Id. at 663–64.
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later refused to permit opinion testimony based on a meta-analysis because the
138
underlying studies did not independently show a statistically significant risk.
Many courts have endorsed the view that an expert’s reliance on
epidemiological studies must be delved into in detail, with the court reviewing and
judging each and every study the expert relied upon. Thus, in Kilpatrick v. Breg,
139
Inc., the court held that it was proper for the lower court to analyze each study in
140
detail to determine its independent reliability. The court also found that the use of
141
case reports was not a scientific methodology.
142
Magistrani v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning
considered the
admissibility of expert testimony based upon the weight-of-the-evidence
methodology, where the expert evaluated multiple types of studies and data, such
as epidemiology studies, in vitro and animal studies, toxicology studies, and
biological plausibility. Then, taking all of the information as a whole, the expert
143
reached his opinion. The court found that the expert’s opinion was not admissible
because there was no reliable scientific method dictating how to weigh all of this
144
evidence. Rather, the court accepted the defense expert’s opinion that each
underlying study and piece of evidence must be separately analyzed and its
145
reliability independently assessed. In other words, an expert cannot look at the
totality of the evidence and determine that the whole is greater than the sum of its
146
parts.
147
Similarly, in Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine, Inc., the court rejected a weightof-the-evidence analysis by looking at the fifty-plus studies relied upon by the
expert and concluding that none standing alone gave an adequate basis for the
148
causation opinion. The court simply ignored or misunderstood the weight-of-the149
evidence methodology.
PART III: JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE METHODOLOGY USED BY REAL WORLD
SCIENTISTS WILL LEAD TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT OPINIONS
Other courts have chosen not to become amateur scientists or to adopt
defense arguments lock, stock, and barrel, instead simply doing what FRE 702

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106339, at *13 (E.D. La. 2009).
613 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1341.
Id. at 1339.
180 F. Supp. 2d 584 (D. N.J. 2002).
Id. at 599–600.
Id. at 601–02.
Id.
Id.
482 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 355.
See generally id.
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and Daubert require: confirm that the expert is applying the same rigor in the
courtroom as would be applied in the laboratory and before federal, state, and
international regulatory and standard-setting bodies.
The critical determination is whether comparable experts accept the
soundness of the methodology, including the reasonableness of relying
on this type of underlying data and information. Great difficulties can
arise when judges, assuming the role of scientist, attempt to assess the
150
validity of a complex scientific methodology.
The court in Rubanick was particularly concerned about a trial judge trying
to second-guess an expert.
[T]he trial court here “independently reviewed” each of the thirteen
studies on which [the expert] relied, and decided that they “do not say
what plaintiff’s expert concludes.” In engaging in such an analysis, the
court substituted its own assessment of the studies for that of an
acknowledged expert. [However,] “[t]he interpretation of the data . . . is
the function of the qualified expert . . . . [C]ourts should be loath to
determine whether the particular expert has properly relied upon data
151
which experts in the field generally rely on.”
The actual inquiry should not be about the judge’s personal interpretation of
the underlying scientific support for an expert’s opinion, but rather the reliability
of the expert’s methodology.
Thus, the inquiry is not the reliability of the expert’s ultimate opinion nor
is it whether the expert thought his or her own reliance on the underlying
data was reasonable, nor whether the court thinks that the expert’s
reliance was reasonable. The proper inquiry is whether comparable
152
“experts in the field [would] actually rely” on that information.
Not all courts have accepted defendants’ efforts to reduce an expert’s opinion
153
and methodology ad absurdum. In Ruff v. Ensign-Bickford Company, the
plaintiffs had been diagnosed with non-Hodkins Lymphoma (NHL), allegedly
154
due to chemicals in the water they drank. The plaintiffs’ experts showed that
the chemicals at issue could cause NHL, but the defendant argued that there are
several subtypes of NHL, and plaintiffs should be required to show that the
specific subtype at issue was caused by the chemicals to which they were
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
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Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 593 A.2d 733, 748 (N.J. 1991) (citation omitted).
Id. at 749 (internal citations omitted).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
168 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Utah 2001).
Id. at 1273–74.

03_LIPTON_V2_3-18-14_FINAL_03.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/10/2014 10:52 AM

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 45
155

exposed. The court held that studies of the exact subtype of NHL were not
156
Rather, the defendant’s argument could be used on crossnecessary.
examination to challenge the weight of the testimony; it did not go to
157
admissibility.
Recognizing that Rule 702 was intended to relax traditional barriers to expert
158
opinion testimony, the court in Cook v. Rockwell International Corp. held that
a liberal standard should be applied and doubts should be resolved in favor of
159
admissibility. The court noted that “epidemiology cannot objectively prove
causation; rather causation is a judgment by epidemiologists and others
160
interpreting epidemiological data.” The court then concluded that opinions
based on studies showing even a weak association between exposure and disease
161
are not unreliable per se as a matter of science or law. Rather, the weakness of
162
the association goes to the weight to be given to the opinion testimony.
163
Similarly, admissibility does not depend upon statistically significant results.
“The statistical significance or insignificance of [a study’s] results may affect the
weight given to [the expert’s] testimony, but does not determine its admissibility
164
under Rule 702.”
165
In McClellan v. I-Flow Corp. the defendants argued that studies showing
just an association between a condition and a disease (i.e., a RR <2) could not
166
reliably support a causation opinion. Rather, they demanded “conclusive”
167
evidence of causation before an opinion could be admissible. The court rejected
168
this argument outright. Expert testimony based on studies showing “only” an
association should not be excluded where the expert can explain “why the
169
association is valid and how causation can be inferred . . . .” The court also
permitted reliance upon in vitro and in vivo animal studies, as well as case
reports, because scientists and doctors rely upon these types of studies, as
170
evidenced by the use of these types of studies in the scientific literature. Rule
702 does not impose on the court either the obligation or the authority to become
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 1279.
Id.
Id.
580 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. Colo. 2006).
Id. at 1082.
Id. at 1095.
Id. at 1097–98.
Id.
Id. at 1103.
Id.
710 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (D. Or. 2010).
Id. at 1100.
Id. at 1101.
Id.
Id. at 1102 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1110–11.
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an amateur scientist in order to perform the gatekeeping function. “‘[A]nalogy,
inference and extrapolation can be sufficiently reliable’ when the expert’s
opinion is the ‘kind that a reasonable scientist or physician would make in a
decision of importance arising in the exercise of his profession outside the
171
context of litigation.’”
172
King v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company is one of the best
primers on the admissibility of epidemiologic evidence. It lays out in simple
terms virtually every issue that might arise in considering an epidemiologist’s
opinion testimony and explains how the courts should approach and resolve these
173
questions.
The court starts with the notion that “epidemiological studies cannot prove
causation, they can [only] provide a foundation for an epidemiologist to infer and
174
opine that a certain agent can cause a disease.” Thus, contrary to defendants’
175
usual arguments, a study cannot objectively prove or disprove causation.
Rather, the strengths and weaknesses of associations found in epidemiological
176
studies must be assessed. This requires judgment as to how the findings fit with
177
other scientific information.
The court then discussed relative risk as one of the cornerstones for causal
178
inferences. Where a study shows a relative risk greater than 1.0, a positive
179
association exists to support a causal inference. The greater the relative risk, the
180
greater the likelihood that the relationship is causal. If the relative risk is
greater than 2.0, this means a greater than fifty percent likelihood the agent
caused the disease, permitting an inference of both general and specific
181
causation. But in considering relative risk, the questions of potential sources of
182
error and statistical significance also arise. The court noted that a poorly
designed or executed study that is “statistically significant could be less reliable
183
than a well-conceived and conducted study that is not statistically significant.”
Thus, the inquiry into causation is not just about whether or not there is a high
enough relative risk that is statistically significant. Rather, “it involves subjective
judgment. Experts consider several factors under different sets of criteria that can

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
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Id. at 1110.
762 N.W.2d 24 (Neb. 2009).
See generally id.
Id. at 36.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 36–37.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 39.
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point to causation. Relative risk presents only one factor that they consider.”
The court then concluded as to relative risk:

184

So we decline to set a minimum threshold for relative risk, or any other
statistical measurement, above the minimum requirement that the study
show a relative risk greater than 1.0. We agree that “it would be far
preferable for the district court to instruct the jury on statistical
significance and then let the jury decide whether many studies over the
1.0 mark have any significance in combination.” In short, the
significance of epidemiological studies with weak positive associations is
185
a question of weight, not admissibility.
Regarding statistical significance, the court concluded:
We agree that statistical significance is the most obvious way for a court
to determine that researchers properly ruled out random variations in the
population sample accounting for the result. But those decisions
requiring a study’s relative risk to be statistically significant have come
under fire. Experts have pointed out that the lack of statistical
significance does not demonstrate that there is no relationship. So not all
courts impose a requirement of statistical significance. We also decline
to impose a statistical significance requirement if an expert shows that
others in the field would nonetheless rely on the study to support a
causation opinion and that the probability of chance causing the study’s
186
results is low.
The court also considered the weight-of-the-evidence methodology, which
187
“comprehensively analyzes the data from different scientific fields.” As Justice
Stevens had said, “it cannot be intrinsically ‘unscientific’ for experienced
professionals to arrive at a conclusion by weighing all available scientific
188
evidence.” The court also recognized that there is no generally accepted
189
method for determining how much weight to apply to different types of studies.
190
Yet the US EPA uses this methodology to assess risk, showing that the
methodology is applied by scientists functioning in the real world outside of the
courtroom.

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 39–40.
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Alternatively, the court considered the Bradford Hill factors used by
191
epidemiologists to assess causation. These factors include (1) temporal
relationship, (2) strength of the association, (3) dose-response relationship, (4)
replication of the findings, (5) biological plausibility, (6) consideration of
alternative explanations, (7) cessation of exposure, (8) specificity of the
192
association, and (9) consistency with other knowledge. Yet these factors are not
mandatory criteria etched in stone. One or more of the factors may be absent,
they may be weighted differently depending upon the circumstances, and a
193
subjective element is present in judging whether causation exists.
194
The court next looked at dose-response, “a hallmark of toxicology.” While
some courts require proof that a plaintiff’s actual exposure to an agent was at a
level proven to be dangerous, the court noted that a dose-response relationship is
195
not essential to proof of causation. Moreover, an expert may be able to infer the
196
exposure level without precise exposure information. In fact, rarely do
197
exposures occur in a manner that permits a quantitative determination. Thus,
198
semiquantitative or qualitative estimates of exposure may be sufficient.
Finally, the court noted that, at heart, an expert’s opinion must be based on
good grounds, derived by the scientific method and supported by appropriate
199
validation, not subjective belief or unsupported speculation. “If the underlying
data are so lacking in probative force and reliability that no reasonable expert
could base an opinion on them, an opinion which rests entirely upon them must
200
be excluded. ” The focus should be on “whether no reasonable expert would
rely on the studies to find a causal relationship—not whether the parties dispute
201
their force or validity.” The court concluded that “while the trial court acts as
202
the evidentiary gatekeeper, it is not a goalkeeper.”
What started out as another case of slicing and dicing to reach summary
judgment for a defendant, turned out on appeal to be a major victory for science
in the courtroom and the generally-accepted methodology of looking at the whole
203
picture. Milward v. Acuity Specialty Product Group, Inc. involved a plaintiff
who developed acute promyelocytic Leukemia (APL), a subtype of acute

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
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myeloid leukemia (AML), from benzene exposure. Plaintiff’s expert offered
the opinion that a number of factors, taken together, showed a causal relationship
205
between benzene and APL. The expert noted that APL is just a subtype of
AML; that all AML subtypes derive from genetically damaged stem cells; and
206
that all AMLs involve transposition of chromosomes. Moreover, most
207
epidemiology studies do not differentiate between subtypes of AML. The
defendant and its experts, on the other hand, argued that while benzene has been
shown to cause some types of AML, it has not been shown to cause all subtypes,
208
such as APL.
The plaintiff in Milward offered at the Daubert hearing, in addition to the
testimony of its causation expert, the opinions of an expert on scientific
209
methodology to support the methodology utilized by plaintiff’s trial expert.
This has become a common tactic used by defendants to challenge plaintiffs’
experts but has been a less common device utilized by plaintiffs. It was extremely
210
effective and helpful in Milward.
The methodology expert addressed in his initial report (and then a
supplemental declaration responding to the defense experts) the basic principle
that scientists not only disagree on ultimate conclusions but also often disagree
on applicable theories, what evidence should be considered, and the weight to
211
give the various matters considered. Moreover, “quite respectable scientists
may reasonably differ in their scientific judgments even if they agree on the same
212
data and on considerations that guide theory choices.” The plaintiff’s
methodology expert then noted:
[A] scientist, in reviewing and assessing all the scientific evidence for a
conclusion . . . must consider and integrate all the available relevant
evidence, utilizing his or her professional judgment to come to a
conclusion about the best explanation to account for an observed
association. Moreover, this review should include consideration of all
available and relevant human evidence, evidence from experimental
animals, scientific reviews, chemical structure-biological activity
evidence, various kinds of mechanistic evidence (which may or may not

204. Id. at 140.
205. Id. at 142.
206. Id. at 143–44.
207. Milaward v. Acuity Specialty Prod. Group, Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 24 n.18 (1st Cir. 2011).
208. Milward, 664 F. Supp 2d at 146.
209. Milward, 639 F.3d at 19.
210. See id.
211. Id. at 21 n.14.
212. Supplemental Declaration of Carl F. Cranor, PH.D, M.S.L., at ¶ 4 Milward v. Acuity Specialty
Products Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011).
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be available), a range of experimental studies that could assist inferences
213
and so on.
As the methodology expert stated, the weight-of-the-evidence methodology
is used by the IARC and the US Toxicology Program “for determining whether a
214
substance is a known or probable human carcinogen.” He also explained:
As part of a review of the science, whether for assessing claims in
physics or human health, scientific judgment is critically involved not
only for drawing the ultimate conclusions, but also for a number of steps
along the way . . . . An expert reviews the body of data that appear to
bear on causal judgments, selects the scientifically relevant data, assesses
and weighs studies for their quality, weighs the importance of different
kinds of data vis-à-vis one another (e.g., animal studies versus human
studies versus short-term studies versus structure-activity relationships
versus mechanistic evidence versus any case studies and so on), and
brings her background understanding of biology and toxicology, as well
as her understanding of the phenomena, to the causal issues. Scientific
judgment also enters into integrating all the data and how it bears on
evaluating different possible explanations in light of all the evidence and
215
the particular phenomena to be explained (e.g., a disease).
The expert then analyzed the defense experts’ opinions at length, accusing
them of “an impoverished conception of scientific evidence” contrary to national
216
He showed how the defense
and international scientific approaches.
disregarded scientific evidence contrary to procedures at NTP and IARC,
misused the Bradford Hill considerations (not mandatory criteria as defendants
would have the court believe), and ignored selection bias in the studies they
217
relied upon.
Thus, plaintiff’s methodology expert was able to give the court an overview
of the weight-of-the-evidence scientific methodology, an appraisal of what the
plaintiff’s expert had done and why it was consistent with scientific processes
used nationally and internationally, and a critique of the defense experts’ bias and
218
misuse of accepted methodology. As seen from the result in Milward, using a
separate expert from the testifying expert offering the substantive opinions for
219
trial can be an effective and persuasive strategy.

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
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See supra notes 134–137 and accompanying text.
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In spite of all the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony, the trial court held that
plaintiff’s expert could not extrapolate from general benzene studies or studies of
other subtypes to APL because the chromosome translocations were not
220
identical. Nor was the expert permitted to testify based upon the totality of
221
similarities among AML subtypes. The trial court also noted the absence of
epidemiology studies showing a causal connection between benzene and APL
even though there are not enough cases of APL to support a statistically
222
significant epidemiology study. The result was that the defendants were able to
exclude expert testimony by slicing and dicing the disease into subtypes for
which it is impossible to conduct epidemiology studies, and then convinced the
court that in the absence of epidemiology studies there can be no proof of
causation. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in what must be viewed as
223
a major victory for plaintiffs. Recognizing this, the defendants have petitioned
224
the United States Supreme Court for certiorari.
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by noting that courts are not
“empowered to determine which of several competing theories has the best
225
provenance.” It then noted, quoting Daubert, “So long as an expert’s scientific
testimony rests upon ‘good grounds,’ based on what is known, it should be tested
by the adversarial process, rather than excluded for fear that jurors will not be
226
able to handle the scientific complexities.” If all courts followed this tenet, the
admissibility of expert testimony would be less about slicing and dicing an
expert’s opinion and methodology and more about whether the expert followed
practices relied upon real scientists functioning in the real world.
Milward’s expert had applied the weight-of-the-evidence methodology by
227
applying the Bradford Hill “viewpoints” for determining causation to five
228
bodies of evidence. The Court of Appeals recognized that scientific judgment is
3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011).
220. Id. at 144.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 146.
223. 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011).
224. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Milward, 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 2012 U.S. Lexis 229 (U.S.
Jan. 9, 2012) (No. 11-316).
225. Milward, 639 F.3d at 15 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
226. Id.
227. The Bradford Hill “viewpoints” involve consideration of nine factors, none of which are conclusive
and not all need be present. Moreover, the various criteria cannot be ranked into any kind of hierarchy of
significance. The Bradford Hill factors are:
[T]he strength or frequency of the association; the consistency of the association in varied circumstances;
the specificity of the association; the temporal relationship between the disease and the posited cause; the
dose response curve between them; the biological plausibility of the causal explanation given existing
scientific knowledge; the coherence of the explanation with generally known facts about the disease; the
experimental data that relates to it; and the existence of analogous causal relationships.
Id. at 17.
228. These included “the fact that benzene causes AML as a class, that all subtypes of AML likely have a
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necessary to conduct the weight-of-the-evidence analysis. Quoting Comment (c)
to the Third Restatement of Torts §28, the court noted, “No algorithm exists for
applying the Hill guidelines to determine whether an association truly reflects a
causal relationship or is spurious. Because ‘[n]o scientific methodology exists for
this process . . . reasonable scientists may come to different judgments about
229
whether such an inference is appropriate.’” Thus, the evaluation of scientific
evidence requires judgment and interpretation similar to that used in a differential
diagnosis. The court recognized:
The fact that the role of judgment in the weight of the evidence approach
is more readily apparent than it is in other methodologies does not mean
that the approach is any less scientific. No matter what methodology is
used, “an evaluation of data and scientific evidence to determine whether
an inference of causation is appropriate requires judgment and
interpretation.” [Thus], [n]o serious argument can be made that the
230
“weight of the evidence approach is inherently unreliable.”
The trial court had looked at all the evidentiary components of the expert’s
analysis atomistically, requiring the ultimate opinion to be supported by each
piece of evidence independently. But under the weight-of-the-evidence approach,
no body of evidence was itself treated as justifying an inference of
causation. Rather, each body of evidence was treated as grounds for the
subsidiary conclusion that it would, if combined with other evidence,
support a causal inference. The district court erred in reasoning that
because no one line of evidence supported a reliable inference of
causation, an inference of causation based on the totality of the evidence
was unreliable . . . .The hallmark of the weight of the evidence approach
231
is reasoning to the best explanation for all of the available evidence.
The court noted that the fact that there might be another explanation for the
232
evidence is not a sufficient basis for excluding the expert testimony. Any
233
alleged flaws go to the weight to be given the opinion, not its admissibility.
Lastly, the court looked at the epidemiological evidence that the plaintiff’s
expert had relied upon. The court concluded that the paucity of epidemiological

common etiology, that benzene is known to cause the general types of cellular damage that are known to cause
APL, that benzene is known to inhibit an enzyme whose inhibition is known to cause APL, and that APL has
been reported in benzene-exposed workers in a number of epidemiological studies.” See id. at 20.
229. Id. at 18 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 28 reporters’ note cmts. c(3) and c(4) (2010).
230. Id. at 18–19.
231. Id. at 23.
232. Id. at 22.
233. Id.
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studies did not make it “almost impossible” for the expert’s opinion to be
234
admissible, as the defendants had argued. “Epidemiological studies are not per
235
se required as a condition of admissibility regardless of context.”
Here, the
rarity of the disease makes it very difficult to perform an epidemiological study
236
of the causes of APL. Moreover, the lack of statistically significant studies was
237
not a deviation from sound scientific methodology under these circumstances.
The fact that APL has been observed in studies of exposed workers was a piece
of the total weight-of-the-evidence puzzle, indicating that the epidemiological
evidence was at least consistent with the expert’s conclusion that benzene causes
238
APL.
Thus, the appellate court found that plaintiff’s expert had reasonably applied
239
a reliable methodology. Questions about the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the ultimate opinion go to the weight of the opinion, not its
240
admissibility. This is how it should be.
Unfortunately, upon remand, the trial court found that the plaintiff’s specific
causation expert, though board certified in occupational medicine, pathology, and
241
hematology was not qualified to interpret epidemiological studies. She
therefore could not offer a reliable opinion to address cumulative exposure as a
242
cause of increased risk of leukemia. Without a specific causation expert to link
the plaintiff’s exposures to his illness, the court granted summary judgment to the
243
defendant.
Finally in this regard, the West Virginia Supreme Court recently conducted a
lengthy and thoughtful analysis of the Daubert process in Harris v. CSX
244
Transportation, Inc. The court emphasized that the court’s gatekeeper role is
simply to determine whether the expert’s science is reliable, not whether it is
right: “right or wrong is not an issue of the admissibility of scientific
245
evidence.”
Noting that the purpose of Daubert was to “liberalize the rules governing the
admissibility of expert testimony” and that Rule 702 “is one of admissibility

234. Id. at 24.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 17.
237. Id. at 24.
238. Id. at 25.
239. Id. at 26.
240. See id.
241. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1285 at *36 (September 6, 2013).
242. Id.
243. Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., No. 07-11944-DPW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127473, at
*4025 (D. Mass. September Sept. 6, 2013).
244. No. 12-1135, 2013 W. Va. LEXIS 1285 (W.V. Nov. 13, 2013).
245. Id. at *11.
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246

rather than exclusion, ” the court accused litigants of abusing the process and
247
crowding dockets with unnecessary Daubert hearings. The court held instead,
[W]hen a trial court is called upon to determine the admissibility of
scientific expert testimony, in deciding the “reliability” prong of
admissibility the focus of the trial court’s inquiry is limited to
determining whether the expert employed a methodology that is
recognized in the scientific community for rendering an opinion on the
subject under consideration. If the methodology is recognized in the
scientific community, the court should then determine whether the expert
correctly applied the methodology to render his or her opinion. If these
two factors are satisfied, and the testimony has been found to be relevant,
248
and the expert is qualified, the expert may testify at trial.
The court went on to conclude that courts should take judicial notice of
generally recognized scientific methodologies and reserve Daubert evidentiary
hearings for new scientific and technical methodologies that cannot be judicially
249
noticed and require a hearing to test reliability. Daubert hearings should not be
held where qualified experts simply disagree about the interpretation of data
250
obtained through standard methodologies.
Unfortunately, it is this author’s experience that defendants all too often file
Daubert motions and seek evidentiary hearings where both sides’ experts apply
the same methodologies but reach different conclusions. Too many courts then
hold evidentiary hearings and allow challenges to underlying facts,
interpretations of data, and opinions that are at variance from the defendants’
experts’ opinions, even though none of these are grounds for exclusion of expert
testimony.
PART IV: A FRAMEWORK FOR PRESENTING A PLAINTIFF’S EPIDEMIOLOGY
EXPERT ON CAUSATION
The cases addressed above, both favorable and unfavorable, suggest an
approach for plaintiffs going into a Daubert hearing on the admissibility of the
opinions of an expert epidemiologist. There are, of course, no guarantees, and
there is bad law, and at times bad facts, to be overcome.
First, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to fully explain to the court the
weight-of-the-evidence and Bradford Hill methodologies. This should be briefed
at length, and the expert should be prepared to address it both at deposition and in
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
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live testimony. It is critically important to show to the court how the various
factors to be considered are “viewpoints” and not “criteria.” As Austin Bradford
Hill wrote, “None of my nine viewpoints can bring indisputable evidence for or
against the cause-and-effect hypothesis and none can be required as a sine qua
251
non.”
It is also important to emphasize that the weight-of-the-evidence
methodology is used by American and international regulatory and standard252
setting agencies such as the EPA, OSHA, ATSDR, NTP, IARC and WHO. If
the purpose of Rule 702 is to make sure that the expert witness uses the same
253
rigor in an analysis in the courtroom as in the real world, then this evidence
should be persuasive.
A thorough discussion of the Milward and King cases and the evidentiary
reliability of the weight-of-the-evidence methodology, because of its scientific
validity, is imperative. It is also helpful to discuss those cases, such as U.S. v.
254
255
W.R. Grace and Rubanick, which emphasize the court’s duty to take a
“holistic approach” to expert testimony and not try to dissect the underlying data
256
the expert relies upon.
Second, it is important to explain in the brief to the court, as well as through
the expert’s testimony, the key principles of epidemiology and how
epidemiologists apply them outside of the courtroom. This means discussing
relative risk, statistical significance, dose-response, healthy worker effect,
selection bias, biological plausibility, and the other terms that will arise. This
allows you to show that the defendants’ views on these concepts are not
mainstream science but distortions and misapplications of epidemiological
257
principles. Discussing the King case can be particularly helpful in this regard.
The court in King recognized a number of important principles that should be
presented to the court in your case. First, epidemiological studies cannot prove
causation but they can be the foundation for an opinion that an agent can cause a
disease. To do this, the epidemiologist must determine how a “study’s findings fit
258
with other scientific knowledge on the subject.”
Second, a plaintiff’s claim should not fail simply because the medical
literature has not yet conclusively proven the connection between an agent and a
disease. A plaintiff need only produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable person

251. Sir Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?, 58 PROC.
ROYAL SOC’Y OF MED. 295, 297 (1965).
252. See EPA, Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33992, 33996 (1986).
253. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
254. 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011).
255. 593 A.2d 733 (N.J.1991).
256. See, e.g., W.R. Grace, 639 F.3d at 41 (noting Rule 702’s “holistic focus on an expert’s testimony”).
257. 762 N.W. 2d 24. (Neb. 2009).
258. Id. at 36.
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259

to conclude that the exposure caused the injury. Only where “the underlying
data are so lacking in probative force . . . that no reasonable expert could base an
260
opinion on [that data] should an opinion be excluded.”
All an epidemiological study can do is show the strength of an association
261
between an agent and an outcome. The strength of that association is reported
262
as the relative risk. If the relative risk is greater than 1.0, a positive association
exists because the risk to the exposed group is greater than the risk to the
263
unexposed population. A relative risk greater than 1.0 thus supports a causal
264
inference.
Where the relative risk is 2.0, the agent will have caused an equal number of
265
injuries as all other background causes. Thus, if the relative risk is greater than
2.0, this establishes a greater than 50% likelihood that the agent caused the
266
injury. By showing that it is more likely than not that the agent caused the
injury, a relative risk greater than 2.0 not only proves general causation, but
267
many courts accept it as evidence of specific causation as well.
Some courts improperly exclude an expert’s opinion on general as well as
specific causation where the expert relies on a study with a relative risk less than
268
2.0. Other courts more properly recognize that any relative risk greater than 1.0
is at least some evidence of a causal association and is thus relevant to the
269
general causation inquiry. Just because a relative risk is less than 2.0 does not
mean it is irrelevant: “weak associations can indicate a causal relationship,
270
depending upon the presence of other factors.” Many workplace studies, for
271
example, underestimate the relative risk. This is why the court in King refused
to set a minimum threshold for relative risk, other than that a study must show a
272
relative risk greater than 1.0 as some evidence of a causal association. Thus,
“the significance of epidemiological studies with weak positive associations is a
273
question of weight, not admissibility.” This principle is of paramount
importance and must be emphasized to the court.

259.
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Defendants often seek to exclude epidemiological studies on the grounds that
they are not statistically significant. Statistical significance measures the risk of
random variations or chance causing the study’s results; a statistically significant
274
result is not likely the result of chance. The risk can be shown as a p-value
(which measures the probability that a positive association resulted from
sampling error) or as a confidence interval (showing the magnitude and stability
275
of the association).
However, there are confounding errors other than chance that could affect a
study’s results but are not measured by statistical significance. For example, a
data collection error, an underestimate or overestimate of exposure, or an
improper comparison group could all impact a study’s results without showing
up in a measure of statistical significance. Thus, a “poorly conceived or
conducted study that is statistically significant could be far less reliable than a
276
well-conceived and conducted study that is not statistically significant.”
While many courts prohibit reliance on studies that lack strong statistical
significance, that does not mean a study with a weaker statistical significance
does not show a causal relationship. Because of this, some courts refuse to
impose a requirement for statistical significance where the expert can show that
277
others in the field would rely on the study to support an opinion on causation.
In the end, any expert opinion on causation involves a subjective judgment.
Contrary to what defendants most vociferously argue, proving causation is not an
objective inquiry depending solely upon a statistically significant relative risk
278
greater than 2.0. As the court noted in King, “a weight-of-the-evidence
methodology . . . comprehensively analyzes data from different scientific fields,
primarily animal tests and epidemiological studies, to assess carcinogenic
279
risks.” This methodology is permissible even though there are no agreed-upon
280
standards for how to weigh the particular pieces of evidence being considered.
Alternatively, many epidemiologists utilize the Bradford Hill “viewpoints” to
assess causation, finding a causal relationship even where one or more of the
281
factors are missing.
[S]ince causal actions of exposures are neither observable nor provable, a
subjective element is present in judging whether, for a given exposure,
such an action exists. As a result, scientists may differ both in terms of

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
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Id. at 37–38.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 39.
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Id. at 39–40.
Id. at 40.
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interpretation of available evidence in support of criteria used to aid
282
causal inference, and in relative weight assigned to each criteria.
Plaintiffs must show courts that the focus should only be on whether the
expert used a valid methodology and has good grounds for the opinions
283
offered. Even studies that do not draw a definitive conclusion on causation may
284
be utilized where reasonable experts would rely on such a study. The fact that
experts may disagree with the conclusions and opinions being offered is not a
basis for exclusion but rather goes to the weight to be given to the evidence at
285
trial.
Third, consider using an expert on scientific methodology at the Daubert
hearing to bolster the testimony of your causation expert. Not only can this expert
help with explaining the weight-of-the-evidence methodology, but he can also
help explain where and how the defense experts misuse or misapply
epidemiological concepts to mislead the court about how epidemiology is
practiced in the real world.
Whether or not you use a separate expert on methodology, your causation
expert needs to initially prepare a detailed report that addresses each opinion and
sub-opinion, discuss the scientific literature in support of the opinions being
offered and show why any contrary literature is inapplicable, unreliable, or
otherwise insufficient to alter his or her opinion. This report should also explain
the weight-of-the-evidence methodology and how the various considerations,
such as the Bradford Hill factors, were taken into account and balanced. Showing
that the methodology used is comparable to what other experts have employed,
particularly in a non-litigation setting, is imperative. Your trial expert must then
be thoroughly prepared for deposition, making sure to be comfortable answering
questions about all the scientific literature relied upon or deemed inapplicable.
Again, being able to explain how various factors were considered and weighed
can go a long way to preserving the admissibility of the ultimate opinions.
If the expert reaches additional opinions, or relies upon new materials not
addressed in his or her initial report, consider submitting a supplemental report,
even if the new opinions or materials were addressed at deposition. All too often
courts exclude some or all of an expert’s opinions where they have not been
286
presented in a timely filed report or supplement.
Lastly, where you know you have a court disinclined to accept your
explanation of epidemiology, consider moving under FRE 706 to have the court
appoint a truly independent expert with no ties to industry to advise the court on
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scientific processes, methods, and terms as applied in the laboratory and real
world outside the courtroom. In this regard, it could be helpful to remind the
court that Rule 702 does not require the judge to become an amateur scientist or
to second guess an expert’s interpretation of underlying studies and data. The
only relevant issue is whether the methodology employed by the expert is
scientifically valid and relied upon by scientists in the field.
CONCLUSION
Epidemiology is often essential to proving a toxic tort case. It is critical that
the court and counsel understand the role of the epidemiologist and the applicable
standards to admit such an expert’s testimony. There is a growing body of law
that supports the use of this kind of expert testimony in a reasonable and effective
manner. It should be made clear that the court must look at scientific evidence as
scientists do, taking all of the pieces as a whole, and not slice and dice to decide
if each separate piece is sufficient in and of itself to support the overall opinion
of the expert. As the court in King noted, “while the trial court acts as the
287
evidentiary gatekeeper, it is not a goalkeeper.”

287. Id. at 43.

737

